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August 28, 2020

Via Electronic Mail

Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge Mark A. Hoyer Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Piatt Place 301 5th Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Re:

Docket No. P-2020-3019522

Petition of Duquesne Light Company for Approval of Its Default Service Plan for the Period June 1, 2021 Through May 31, 2025

Dear Judge Hoyer:

Attached, in accordance with the schedule in Your Honor's Prehearing Order is the prepared Surrebuttal Testimony of MAREC-Action Witness Elizabeth Stanton, PhD, in the above matter. A copy of Ms. Stanton's Surrebuttal Testimony is being provided to the persons listed on the attached Certificate of Service.

Very truly yours,

THOMAS, NIESEN & THOMAS, LLC

By

Charles E. Thomas, Jr

Enclosure

cc: Rosemary Chiavetta, Secretary (w/o attachment)

Bruce H. Burcat, Esquire

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 28th day of August, 2020, served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony of Elizabeth A. Stanton, Ph.D. on behalf of MAREC Action, upon the persons listed below which MAREC-Action believes are participating in the proceeding:

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

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BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

Petition of Duquesne Light Company for :

Approval of Its Default Service Plan for the Period June 1, 2021 through May 31, Docket No. P-2020-3019522

2025

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH A. STANTON, PHD

On Behalf of the Intervener MAREC Action

August 28, 2020

1 I. INTRODUCTION

- 2 Q. Please state your name, business address, and position.
- 3 A. My name is Elizabeth A. Stanton, Ph.D. I am the Director and Senior Economist of the
- 4 Applied Economics Clinic, 1012 Massachusetts Avenue, Arlington MA 02476.
- 5 Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
- 6 A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to reply to the rebuttal testimonies of:
- Christopher H. Kallaher on behalf of Interstate Gas Supply, Inc., Shipley Choice
- 8 LLC, NRG Energy, Inc., Vistra Energy Corp., ENGIE Resources LLC, WGL
- 9 Energy Services, Inc., and Direct Energy Services, LLC
- Serhan Ogur on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate
- Scott Fisher on behalf of Duquesne Light

13 II. REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER H. KALLAHER

- 14 Q. Have you reviewed the rebuttal testimony of Christopher H. Kallaher as it relates to
- your direct testimony in this docket?

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- 16 A. Yes. Mr. Kallaher agrees with my assertion that Duquesne has not provided evidence that
- its proposed 7 MW of solar is sufficient to result in a prudent mix of resources and that
- Duquesne has not discussed any analysis performed to determine a prudent mix of
- resources. Mr. Kallaher also suggests that "Duquesne's [solar] proposal is mere tokenism
- rather than a sincere effort to address a proven need."(p.10, lines12-13) Finally, with
- regards to my direct testimony, Mr. Kallaher notes that he "generally agree[s] with her
- demonstration of the potential benefits of incorporating renewables into the grid on a
- potentially large scale."(p.10, lines 13-14)

| 1 | Q. | what did the Commission require of EDCs in their DSP proposals with regards to |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | long-term contracts for renewables? |
| 3 | A. | The Commission requires EDC's to include evidence showing how their DSP proposals |
| 4 | | provide a prudent mix of supply resources. Specifically, in its Secretarial Letter regarding |
| 5 | | the Investigation into Default Service and PJM Interconnection, LLC. Settlement |
| 6 | | Reforms (Docket M-2019-3007101), the Commission references MAREC's comments |
| 7 | | on long-term contracts for renewables, agreed on the importance of this issue, and |
| 8 | | requested EDC's address this procurement mechanism in their default service plan (DSP) |
| 9 | | proposals stating that: |
| 10 | | Concerning procurement and long-term contracts, the Commission agrees |
| 11 | | that long-term contracts need to be carefully considered and that we need |
| 12 | | to consider this topic further in upcoming DSP proceedings. We request |
| 13 | | that the EDCs include in their filings evidence showing how its DSP |
| 14 | | proposal complies with the prudent mix requirements of the Public Utility |
| 15 | | Code [Act 129] and case law. ¹ |
| 16 | Q. | Does Mr. Kallaher agree that Duquesne has failed to meet this obligation? |
| 17 | A. | Yes, Mr. Kallaher agrees with this point made in my direct testimony: Duquesne does not |
| 18 | | provide support for its claim that 7 MW of solar is sufficient to result in a product mix of |
| 19 | | resources. |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |

¹ Pennsylvania Public Service Commission ("PUC" or "Commission") Docket No. M-2019-3007101. January 23, 2020. Secretarial Letter regarding the Investigation into Default Service and PJM Interconnection, LLC. Settlement Reforms ("Secretarial Letter"). Available at: http://www.puc.pa.gov/about_puc/consolidated_case_view.aspx?Docket=M-2019-3007101 p.8

III. REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF SERHAN OGUR

- 2 Q. Have you reviewed the rebuttal testimony of Serhan Ogur as it relates to your direct
- 3 **testimony in this docket?**

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- 4 A. Yes, Mr. Ogur's testimony does not refer directly to my testimony but does address long-
- 5 term contracts for renewables. In critiquing Mr. Kallaher's direct testimony in this
- docket, Mr. Ogur argues that long-term contracts do not represent an obstacle to
- 7 transferring to a new service provider, that claims of risk to customers from locking in a
- 8 long-term price are spurious, and that the very small size of Duquesne's proposed solar
- 9 PPA makes it impossible for it to result in other potential dangers to renewables
- development suggested by Mr. Kallaher. (Mr. Ogur also calls into question whether these
- purported dangers would be realized with respect to larger scale long-term contracts for
- renewables.)

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14 IV. REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF SCOTT FISHER

- 15 Q. Have you reviewed the rebuttal testimony of Scott Fisher as it relates to your own
- 16 **testimony in this docket?**
- 17 A. Yes, Scott Fisher's rebuttal addresses my direct testimony in this docket directly, raising
- several questions and objections. His primary concerns are:
- That my testimony is not specific enough regarding the number of MWs of
- renewables for which Duquesne should pursue a long-term contract.
- That long-term contracts pose a variety of risks to customers including inability to
- take advantage of potential decreases in generation supply prices, falling
- renewable development costs, and future retail electric prices.

| 1 | | • That the 2017 study on the benefits to Pennsylvania of long-term renewables |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | contracts oversimplifies actual default service procurement. |
| 3 | | • That my proxy for updating this study overestimates current benefits. |
| 4 | | • That evidence of long-term renewable contracting in other jurisdictions is |
| 5 | | irrelevant. |
| 6 | Q. | Mr. Fisher argues that your testimony is not specific enough regarding the number |
| 7 | | of MWs of renewables for which Duquesne should pursue a long-term contract. |
| 8 | | How do you respond? |
| 9 | A. | The number of MWs best procured by Duquesne in long-term contracts should be |
| 10 | | determined by means of an all-resource RFP that requests bids for both energy and |
| 11 | | AECs. If, as Mr. Fisher claims on p. 8 of his rebuttal, Duquesne already plans to conduct |
| 12 | | just such an all-resource RFP for its default supply, then a review of these bids will reveal |
| 13 | | the optimal amount of long-term renewables to contract for. If, however, Duquesne's |
| 14 | | RFP is limited in the amount of resources that it is requesting (e.g., limited to 7 MW), |
| 15 | | then that limited RFP cannot shed light on the optimal amount of long-term renewables |
| 16 | | contracts to procure. An RFP for 7 MW or smaller bids cannot inform the question of the |
| 17 | | "right" number of MWs. |
| 18 | Q. | How should the Commission assess whether or not an EDC has procured enough |
| 19 | | MW in long-term renewables contracts? |
| 20 | A. | As I explained in my direct testimony, the first and best choice is to conduct and all- |
| 21 | | resource RFP for both energy and AECs, and then using the resulting bids to determine |
| 22 | | the optimal number and type of MW for which to contract. In the event that such an RFP |

is not conducted, or the RFP limits responses to an arbitrary, pre-determined number of

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| 1 | | MWS, there is no standard for determining the number of MW of long-term renewables |
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| 2 | | that will most benefit utility customers. |
| 3 | | In the absence of such a standard, I recommend that the Commission provide a minimum |
| 4 | | percentage threshold for long-term renewables contracts as a share of default service that |
| 5 | | it finds consistent with its requirement that EDCs show how their DSP proposals provide |
| 6 | | a prudent mix of supply resources. |
| 7 | Q. | Mr. Fisher argues that long-term contracts pose a variety of risks to customers |
| 8 | | including inability to take advantage of potential decreases in: generation supply |
| 9 | | prices, falling renewable development costs, and future retail electric prices. How do |
| 10 | | you respond? |
| 11 | A. | Mr. Fisher paints a worst-case picture of future market conditions and neglects to |
| 12 | | mention the risks to Duquesne's customers of missing out on the advantage of today's |
| 13 | | long-term renewable contracts. In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Ogur-writing on behalf of |
| 14 | | Pennsylvania's Office of Consumer Advocate—critiques the use of these same |
| 15 | | unsubstantiated points in Mr. Kallaher's direct testimony, stating: |
| 16 | | [W]hile it is certainly possible that long-term contracts may turn out to be |
| 17 | | uneconomic over the course of the delivery period relative to then- |
| 18 | | prevailing market prices, it is just as possible that the contracts turn out to |
| 19 | | be below market over the course of the delivery period. What is relevant |
| 20 | | here is that the future market prices for energy, solar AECs, or capacity |
| 21 | | are not known. Therefore, long-term solar PPAs for energy and AECs, and |
| 22 | | possibly for capacity and ancillary services attributes as well, operate as a |
| 23 | | hedge against large price increases during the term of the contract, not |

1 necessarily as a means to secure the lowest possible price at any particular 2 time. In fact, the Commission supports this view by giving EDCs the 3 flexibility to include long-term products in their default service product 4 portfolios.(p.9, lines 3-12) 5 In short: long-term contracts provide important customer benefits as a hedge on future 6 uncertainties, not by guaranteeing that they provide the lowest price on every day or in 7 every contract period over the year-long term of the contract, but rather by providing a 8 guarantee of a stable, known price over the long term. 9 Q. Do long-term renewables contracts put customers at risk? 10 No, the inclusion of long-term renewables contracts in default service supply lowers A. 11 customer risk; it does not increase customer risk. Because the future is uncertain, risk can 12 only be lowered through diversification of investments and commitments. Long-term 13 renewables contracts provide a hedge against both price volatility and increasing prices 14 over time. 15 Q. Mr. Fisher argues that the 2017 study on the benefits to Pennsylvania of long-term 16 renewables contracts oversimplifies actual default service procurement. How do you 17 respond? 18 A. Mr. Fisher is correct that the 2017 study provides a simple, illustrative comparison of 19 long-term renewable PPAs versus default supply. The choice of undertaking a high-level 20 policy study has several benefits over detailed modeling more rooted in the admittedly 21 complex nuances of Pennsylvania's default supply regulation. Illustrative policy 22 modeling permits the possibility that current regulation could—and perhaps must— 23 change in order to accommodate new ideas, new opportunities, and increasingly

1 important environmental values and requirements. Regulation can and should be adapted 2 to best serve current and future customer needs. 3 Q. What can be learned from the 2017 study? 4 A. The results of the 2017 study are best interpreted as indicative of possible routes to and 5 sources of benefits to customers. From this initial assessment, we observe that long-term renewable contracts: (1) have the potential to lower customer costs under the right 6 7 circumstances; (2) provide costs with respect to default service that are lower when the 8 terms of the contract are longer; and (3) provide costs with respect to default service that 9 are lower when the price of natural gas is higher.

10 Q. Mr. Fisher argues that your proxy for updating the 2017 study overestimates current benefits. How do you respond?

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A.

- Mr. Fisher correctly points out an error in my proxy for updating the 2017 study but my error did not overestimate current benefits. On the contrary, my error underestimated current benefits: solar and wind prices have been falling even more rapidly than procurement auction prices than I suggested in my direct testimony.
- Mr. Fisher is correct in pointing out that I neglected to adjust auction price for the effects of inflation. In the attachment to my testimony, I correct this error: I stated in my direct testimony that "On average, Pennsylvania procurement auction prices fell by roughly 6 percent per year from 2015 to 2020"(p. 14, lines 14-15). In fact, real (inflation-adjusted) procurement auction prices fell by nearly 8 percent per year over that period.
- In my direct testimony, I compared the average annual change in inflation-adjusted wind and solar prices from 2016 to 2019 to that of nominal auction prices from 2015 to 2020.

| 1 | | Adjusting the auction growth rates to match the period of data available for renewables |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | prices provided the following, corrected, comparison: |
| 3 | | • From 2016 to 2019, inflation-adjusted Pennsylvania procurement auction |
| 4 | | prices fell by about 1.5 percent |
| 5 | | • From 2016 to 2019, inflation-adjusted average overnight solar prices fell by |
| 6 | | 11-13 percent |
| 7 | | • From 2016 to 2019, inflation-adjusted average overnight wind prices fell by 6 |
| 8 | | percent |
| 9 | | Solar and wind prices appear to be dropping more quickly than auction prices over the |
| 10 | | period for which there are comparable data. |
| 11 | Q. | Mr. Fisher argues that evidence of long-term renewable contracting in other |
| 12 | | jurisdictions is irrelevant. How do you respond? |
| 13 | A. | I disagree. I believe that by taking advantage of the experience of other jurisdictions, |
| 14 | | Pennsylvania gains more practical information about how to provide customer benefits |
| 15 | | while meeting environmental regulations. |
| 16 | Q. | Are other jurisdictions finding ways to adapt current regulations and introduce new |
| 17 | | regulations to make the benefits of long-term renewables contracts accessible to |
| 18 | | utility customers? |
| 19 | A. | Yes. See my direct testimony beginning on page 20. |
| 20 | Q. | Are there any additional examples of long-term contracts being adopted in other |
| 21 | | jurisdictions? |
| 22 | A. | Yes. Washington DC has signed several solar and wind PPAs since 2015, with 12 MW of |
| 23 | | solar PV purchases that are expected to save taxpayers \$30 million, along with wind |

| 1 | | PPAs projected to save taxpayers an additional \$45 million over a 20-year period. ² The |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | PPAs are projected to accelerate DC towards the goal of cutting greenhouse gas |
| 3 | | emissions in half by 2032 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. ³ |
| 4 | | Illinois Power Agency has a long-term renewable resources procurement plan established |
| 5 | | to create a set of competitive procurements of renewable energy for their RPS |
| 6 | | compliance obligations. ⁴ The plan calls for new photovoltaic distributed generation and |
| 7 | | community solar projects up to 2000 kW through 15-year contracts. ⁵ |
| 8 | | Amphitheater Public Schools in Arizona entered a 25-year Solar Services Agreement |
| 9 | | (SSA) in which the school district will pay a flat cost per kilowatt hour for the energy |
| 10 | | produced by their newly installed solar array. ⁶ These systems are projected to provide an |
| 11 | | estimated \$23 million in cost-savings to taxpayers. ⁷ |
| 12 | Q. | Are there any additional examples of long-term contracts being adopted by |
| 13 | | organizations within Pennsylvania? |
| 14 | A. | Yes. As discussed in my direct testimony beginning on p. 20, the City of Philadelphia |
| 15 | | signed a long-term contract for an 80 MW solar project in Adams County, which is now |
| | | |

² DC Department of General Services. No date. "Renewables + Energy Purchasing". Available at: https://dgs.dc.gov/page/renewables-energy-purchasing ³ Ibid.

⁴ Illinois Power Agency. April 20, 2020. Long-Term Renewable Resources Procurement Plan. Final Revised Plan. p.1. Available at: https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/ipa/pages/renewable_resources.aspx

5 Illinois Power Agency. April 9, 2020. Adjustable Block Program REC Contract Request for Stakeholder

Comments. pp.1,8.Available at:

https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/ipa/Documents/ABP%20REC%20Contract%20Update%202020/IL%20ABP%20RE C%20Contract%20Request%20for%20Comments%209%20APR%202020.pdf

⁶ Amphitheater Public Schools. No date. "Amphi Schools Soak Up Solar Energy", Available at: https://www.amphi.com/Page/8184⁷ Ibid.

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- 1 expected to meet 22 percent of the city's energy demand instead of 20 percent as
- 2 originally forecast.⁸
- 3 Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?
- 4 A. Yes.

⁸ City of Philadelphia and Adams County. March 30, 2020. "Adams County, PA Solar Project – Pre-Qualification". Philadelphia Energy Authority. Available at: https://philaenergy.org/public_bids/adams-county-pa-solar-project-pre-qualification/